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ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE 
AND THE RETENTION DECISION 
IN GROUPS 
LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG 
California Institute of Technology 
Understanding why members leave or remain in groups has 
received little attention despite its fundamental importance for organizational main- 
tenance. In this analysis, a theory of experiential search is proposed and applied to Com- 
mon Cause. Group participation is conceptualized as a process by which imperfectly 
informed decision makers learn about the organizations they join. This framework 
makes quitting understandable and provides a link between the initial membership 
choice and follow-up decisions. 
O rganizational 
maintenance is a fact of life all group 
leaders confront. For the majority of in- 
terest group entrepreneurs, who depend 
on constituent dues as a prime funding 
source, maintenance dictates the need to 
keep members contributing (but see 
Walker 1983).' Even seemingly small 
drops in numbers-10% or 20% net of 
replacements-are viewed with great 
alarm; and the loss of long-time con- 
tributors is perceived as a threat to the en- 
tity's survival. The key to creating a suc- 
cessful organization can be summarized 
simply: entice potential members to join, 
keep attrition below the rate at which 
replacements can be found, and establish 
a core membership. 
If this prescription is correct, it is 
curious that analysts of interest group 
membership focus almost exclusively on 
first-time joiners.2 Most authors do not 
deal explicitly with the dynamics underly- 
ing the retention choice, that is, the deci- 
sion by existing members to remain in the 
group and keep on contributing.3 Attract- 
ing members is fundamental for long-term 
organizational prosperity, but signing 
them up in the first place is only half the 
battle. The conditional joining decisions 
on whether to stay in the organization are 
also crucial. 
Interest group entrepreneurs encounter 
a dilemma: how to retain members for 
whom leaving may be an attractive op- 
tion.4 The leaders focus on producing the 
selective incentives that the membership 
wants. They are also preoccupied with 
not antagonizing constituents, for fear 
they will cease contributing. They struc- 
ture and operate the interest group so as 
to facilitate contributions (Moe 1980). 
How else, for example, can one explain 
the elaborate lengths to which many 
leaders will go to ensure the appearance of 
rank-and-file participation in the organi- 
zational decision-making process? 
In the political arena, the retention 
problem should hit home hardest for 
public interest groups. Their leaders lack 
the occupational or industry bases that 
underlie so many private associations. 
They cannot draw on a "natural" mem- 
bership, among whom either selective in- 
centives are easily generated or coercion 
induces contributions. That people sign 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 
VOL. 82 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1988 
This content downloaded from 131.215.248.20 on Thu, 13 Nov 2014 00:43:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 82 
up for public interest groups in the first 
place in light of the collective action di- 
lemma-not to speak of retaining their or- 
ganizational allegiance-is a phenomenon 
that has generated considerable scholarly 
interest (Berry 1977; Smith 1985). 
Why, then, do members of an organiza- 
tion, especially a public interest group, 
choose to remain? Is this process indis- 
tinguishable from the original decision to 
join-whatever that may be? How are the 
two connnected, if at all? 
These issues will be explored by analyz- 
ing what is popularly considered the quin- 
tessential public interest group: Common 
Cause. In the fall of 1981, over 12 hun- 
dred Common Cause members were 
surveyed using a mail questionnaire. All 
respondents were queried about a wide 
variety of issues-membership and its 
benefits, personal attitudes, previous 
history in Common Cause, and future in- 
tentions, to name a few. A stratified 
design oversampled Common Cause- 
designated activists, who were defined as 
steering committee coordinators in con- 
gressional districts or coordinators or ac- 
tivators of telephone networks. They 
comprise 23% of the sample, a roughly 
sixfold overrepresentation. Since this 
stratification is based on characteristics 
that are exogenous to the retention deci- 
sion, this sampling strategy has no impact 
on the hypothesis tests conducted in this 
analysis (Amemiya 1985; Hausman and 
Wise 1979). These data furnish a rare op- 
portunity to explore the retention decision 
and to learn why people participate in 
political organizations despite all the 
obstacles to collective action.5 
The first part of this analysis lays out 
the theoretical groundwork by specifying 
alternative conceptualizations of the 
membership renewal process.6 Despite 
frequent assertions in the literature that 
the study of organizational membership is 
theory-rich and data-poor (e.g., Arnold 
1982; Shaiko 1986), it is argued here that 
the available models require further 
development. Once the proper theoretical 
underpinnings have been laid, the focus 
shifts to the empirical world. Unlike prior 
descriptive work on the original member- 
ship decision by authors who fail to test 
hypotheses, competing retention models 
are made operational and tested to deter- 
mine whether it is possible to make sense 
of members' decisions to stay in or leave 
organizations. 
Theoretical Perspectives: 
Joining, Remaining, 
and Experiential Search 
Although this study looks primarily at 
renewal decisions, the initial reason for 
joining is the logical place to start. In the 
first place, virtually all of the available 
theoretical research focuses on the 
original membership calculus. Second, an 
analysis of the initial choice furnishes a 
vantage point from which to consider the 
renewal decision, and vice versa. The 
challenge is to integrate perspectives on 
both initial contributions and retention 
decisions. 
Parenthetically, the viewpoint taken in 
this analysis and the tradition of research 
in which it is written is decision-theoretic 
rather than game-theoretic, despite the 
latter's importance for studying collective 
action (e.g., Axelrod 1984; Hardin 1982). 
While game theory furnishes many in- 
sights into how actors behave strategi- 
cally in small-number situations, it is in- 
appropriate for explaining why individ- 
uals contribute-and keep contributing- 
to large groups. Decision-theoretic 
models in which individuals are playing 
against nature are more suitable for 
understanding the retention choice. 
Most theorists working in this research 
tradition (e.g., Clark and Wilson 1961; 
Moe 1980; Wilson 1973) typically identify 
a number of benefit types: selective, 
solidary, and purposive. Selective 
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benefits are tangible returns that have 
monetary values and are derived from 
contributions. They either may be divisi- 
ble, private rewards or may emanate from 
members' impacts on the level of collec- 
tive goods provided to everyone. Solidary 
benefits stem from associational interac- 
tions, while purposive benefits are in- 
tangible rewards garnered from con- 
tributing to the group because of its stated 
goals.7 These theorists then examine 
which of these benefit types are important 
and why. 
In the mid-1960s, Mancur Olson (1965) 
revolutionized perceptions about why 
citizens join organized groups. His 
seminal contribution details the difficul- 
ties associated with collective action. In- 
dividuals join large groups, he argues, 
because the value of the available selec- 
tive benefits exceeds the costs of member- 
ship. 
Olson assumes that individuals have 
full information, are only interested in 
economic rewards, and maximize without 
error. In large groups, this implies that 
only dues levels and divisible selective 
benefits will be relevant. Political activity 
is simply a by-product of narrowly self- 
interested behavior. Given this frame- 
work, it is obvious that the conditional 
membership decision should follow the 
same cost-benefit analysis. Since in 
general not much will change from one 
contribution period to the next, particu- 
larly given the assumption of perfect in- 
formation, little explicable organizational 
attrition is possible. 
Those challenging Olson's theory have 
taken two principal tacts. Some (e.g., 
Clark and Wilson 1961; Moe 1980; 
Wilson 1973) emphasize that purposive 
and solidary incentives are important, 
along with selective returns, in the deci- 
sion calculus. 
Individuals who possess perfect infor- 
mation but are not satisfied by selective 
incentives alone may join because the 
potential purposive and solidary payoffs 
push them over the threshold where 
benefits exceed costs. People derive con- 
sumption benefits from interpersonal in- 
teractions and the purposive statements 
their contributions make. The multiplicity 
of incentives can be easily incorporated 
into the Olsonian framework, and the 
same inferences about the conditional 
membership decision still hold. This argu- 
ment is intuitively reasonable; Olson 
himself recognizes the potential impor- 
tance of nonmonetary returns but ignores 
them for reasons of parsimony. 
Another critique is that the key prob- 
lem lies less with the breadth of incentives 
than with the assumption of perfect infor- 
mation. Moe (1980) maintains that poten- 
tial group members do not possess perfect 
information. Consequently, some deci- 
sion makers miscalculate their own con- 
tributions to the provision of collective 
goods and hence the level of selective in- 
centives the group offers. A subset of the 
population mistakenly thinks of itself as 
highly influential and incorporates its 
allegedly substantial contributions to the 
provision of collective goods into its 
membership calculi. Individuals whose 
perceptions of their efficacy put them at 
the upper end of the population distribu- 
tion join in disproportionate numbers. 
The assumption seems to be that once 
these contributors miscalculate, they keep 
repeating the same mistake over and over. 
Again, organizational membership ought 
to be stable, and there should be little 
explicable attrition. 
The relaxation of the perfect informa- 
tion assumption is eminently reasonable 
and extremely important. But precisely 
how imperfect information affects con- 
tributions needs to be rethought. It ought 
to influence more than simply individuals' 
initial estimates of the benefits they derive 
from contributing to collective goods.8 
The conclusion that many members join 
organizations only because they make 
mistakes is unsettling-especially because 
educated individuals tend to join in 
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greater proportions. Implying that those 
committing errors keep contributing for 
years without revising their prior beliefs is 
even more difficult to believe. As in the 
two models elaborated above, the condi- 
tional membership decision replicates the 
initial choice to join. While there may be 
some exogenous forces prompting a few 
individuals to leave, the outcomes gener- 
ally ought to be the same under all three 
models. 
A more reasonable supposition is that 
the decision to join makes sense as a 
strategy by individuals who recognize 
their lack of knowledge. Members join 
groups to learn about them, and as they 
acquire knowledge, some can be expected 
to leave. The politics of experiential 
search offer a superior perspective for 
understanding retention and integrating it 
with the initial membership choice. 
A Theory of Experiential Search 
Organizational membership can be 
conceptualized as a search process. 
Citizens lack complete information about 
all of the alternative groups they might 
join and the associated costs and benefits. 
They presumably would like to discover 
an organization or organizations that will 
give them enough returns relative to 
costs-regardless of the types of benefits 
they seek-that they will be content to re- 
main. 
Experiential search can be distinguished 
from the economics literature on sequen- 
tial search (for an excellent recent over- 
view, see Mortensen 1986). In the latter, 
individuals typically search sequentially 
until they meet their reservation wage or 
price, where the expected marginal cost of 
an additional iteration equals the expected 
marginal return. In these models, workers 
or consumers gather information before 
taking a job or purchasing a product. 
There are some models (e.g., Burdett 
1978; Wilde 1979) that permit on-the-job 
or experiential earning by workers within 
a sequential search framework. These 
perspectives are much closer in spirit to 
the experiential search theory pro- 
pounded here, but there are still impor- 
tant differences. For example, by and 
large, workers must search for a job, 
while there is no similar compulsion to 
join a public interest group. 
In looking for an organization to fill 
their needs, individual decision makers 
with fixed preferences have three options: 
they can (1) conclude that given the prob- 
lems of obtaining information and the 
costs of membership, it is advisable to 
give up; (2) search over alternative associ- 
ations without contributing; or (3) join an 
organization to learn whether member- 
ship is worthwhile. This final option, 
learning through exposure, can have a 
number of facets-developing an under- 
standing about how a group functions, 
whether it is effective in achieving its 
goals, and whether its outputs are in line 
with one's preferences, to name a few. 
Given the low monetary cost of joining 
numerous voluntary associations, 
particularly public interest groups, many 
should opt for experiential learning 
because it is an efficient information- 
gathering technique.9 
A factor predisposing searchers to join 
an organization is that many attributes of 
membership are only observable by par- 
ticipation. These are specific characteris- 
tics, while those that can be observed 
without joining are general characteris- 
tics. These two types can be thought of as 
opposite poles on a continuum that 
reflects the difficulty of acquiring infor- 
mation without making a commitment; 
most informational traits combine 
elements of both. 
Almost every factor incorporated into 
the joining (or retention) calculus can be 
described, at least partially, as a specific 
characteristic. The only purely general 
feature of organizational membership is 
the dues level. If the remaining factors 
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were ranked from more to less general, 
they might roughly be ranked as follows: 
costs other than dues levels, purposive 
benefits, divisible benefits, solidary 
benefits, and collective benefits. 
When the costs of evaluating specific 
qualities are relatively low, prospective 
contributors will tend, ceteris paribus, to 
join, accumulate knowledge, and then 
decide either to quit or to stay and learn 
more. Since a reasonable inference is that 
one accumulates knowledge more and 
more slowly over time, the expected rate 
of dropping out should diminish tempor- 
ally. Specific characteristics should also 
be more important for newcomers than 
for veterans. 
In the organizational context, first-time 
joiners will have imperfect information 
about costs other than dues. How can the 
costs of phone calls asking for assis- 
tance-writing legislators, contacting 
other members, and so on-or appeals for 
monetary contributions in excess of dues 
be established without error in advance? 
As contributors spend time in the group, 
they will develop a growing awareness of 
the true price of membership and behave 
accordingly. 
Along these same lines, the value of 
purposive benefits will be increasingly 
evident with experience. Although 
members will probably have some initial 
idea about what the group stands for, 
they will gradually learn whether it repre- 
sents those things that provide them with 
consumption benefits. 
Before they join, potential members 
will also lack complete information about 
the quality of the divisible benefits fur- 
nished to participants. Accurately assess- 
ing the full value of a groups' offerings 
without consuming them regularly is all 
but impossible; membership offers an op- 
portunity to learn about their utility 
firsthand. 
This inference has an important im- 
plication: Suppose that before engaging in 
experiential search, small contributors 
deduce that their donations will have no 
impact on the level of collective goods 
provided. Presume too that purposive 
and solidary incentives play no role in 
eliciting contributions. Even in this ex- 
treme case where lack of knowledge is ir- 
relevant for an individual's valuation of 
collective, purposive, or solidary benefits, 
imperfect information still ought to be a 
major factor in members' decision calculi. 
If contributors are motivated by 
solidary returns, it is unlikely that they 
will have a full idea of the value of these 
benefits either. Only immersion in day-to- 
day organizational operations will permit 
them to see whether the interpersonal in- 
teractions are sufficiently rewarding. 
Experiential search should be especially 
germane for learning about collective 
goods. Member education should have 
several elements. Contributors ought to 
become more cognizant of what collective 
benefits their organization actually prof- 
fers. Furthermore, those who believe that 
their contributions to the provision of col- 
lective goods are nontrivial should learn 
about the value of these goods and the in- 
significance of their contributions. 
Members who donate resources to have 
an impact on the magnitude of public 
goods provided-and not because they 
gain purposive rewards from contributing 
to collective goods-should leave the 
group over time, ceteris paribus. 
To reiterate, citizens with perfect infor- 
mation (or those who have imperfect in- 
formation but never learn) will join those 
organizations that have the highest net 
benefits for them. While changes in ex- 
ogenous conditions might lead some to 
exit, the strong presumption is, Once a 
participant, always a participants But 
when the assumption of imperfect infor- 
mation is embedded within the experien- 
tial search framework, quitting becomes 
comprehensible. 
Group membership might usefully be 
conceptualized as a decision-theoretic 
process in which members join an organi- 
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Figure 1. Organizational Membership as Experiential Search 
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zation and then reevaluate their decision 
in accordance with what they have 
learned about the costs and benefits of 
participating (see Figure 1). Each member- 
ship renewal period is another stage in 
this decision process. And each time, the 
contributor has better information. 
Learning about specific characteristics 
continues indefinitely, but the amount of 
additional information accumulated 
through experiential search diminishes 
over time. Members weed themselves out, 
especially during their first few years in an 
organization. Information updating can 
reinforce a propensity to remain in the 
group for another contribution period or 
lead to the conclusion that membership is 
less valuable than foregone opportunities. 
Those abdicating membership either 
become politically inactive or continue 
searching for an alternative that makes 
participation worthwhile. For those who 
stay in the organization, over-time learn- 
ing should become a less and less salient 
factor in the decision whether to stay or 
go. 
Experiential Search Theory: 
An Empirical Test 
The experiential search theory implies 
that withdrawal is a rational response by 
imperfectly informed decision makers. 
Unlike the previous three models, under 
this formulation members' cost-benefit 
calculations should change substantially 
over time. This expectation has three im- 
plications that can be tested with cross- 
sectional data on Common Cause mem- 
bership:11 (1) a model of the conditional 
membership decision should uncover fairly 
strong relationships between costs and 
benefits, even for those individuals who 
have previously elected to join; (2) the 
longer contributors have been in the 
organization, the less likely they ought to 
be to leave, because the likely increment in 
knowledge declines over time; and (3) the 
impact of those factors that guide the 
retention calculus, particularly highly 
specific characteristics, ought to be 
stronger for relative newcomers. 
The true test of this framework is how 
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well these theoretical assertions explain 
behavior in the empirical world. Too 
often students of organizational member- 
ship have been content to utilize a few 
descriptive tables-largely because they 
were analyzing the initial membership 
decision with data only about members. 
This research focuses on testable hy- 
potheses about membership dynamics. 
The empirical analysis of Common 
Cause renewal decisions unfolds in four 
steps. First, to provide the proper context, 
I outline the costs and benefits of con- 
tributing to the association. Second, I 
provide descriptive data about the rea- 
sons members say they initially joined, to 
establish a baseline for comparison with 
their subsequent decisions. Third, I exam- 
ine whether those who belong to an 
organization learn over time, to provide 
side evidence about the assertions made 
earlier. Finally, I make models of the con- 
ditional membership process operational 
and directly test them to determine which 
is most empirically valid. 
The Costs and Benefits of Common Cause 
Membership 
Common Cause is the most prominent 
of the new wave of organizations associ- 
ated with the burgeoning consumer move- 
ment of the late 1960s and early 1970s (for 
a detailed case study of Common Cause, 
see McFarland 1984). This feature alone 
makes it a natural candidate for study. 
But it is the leadership's strong de- 
pendence on its more than 200 thou- 
sand members that makes it especially ap- 
pealing for analysis. The members are 
essential because of both their financial 
contributions and their activism at key 
points during the organization's external 
political battles. What, then, are the costs 
and benefits that motivate citizens to con- 
tribute to Common Cause? 
Initially joining the association is a 
reasonably low-cost activity. Organiza- 
tional dues are predictably moderate: $20 
per year. Members are fairly well-off- 
their median family income in 1981 fell in 
the $25 to $35 thousand range, about 50% 
higher than the national average.12 A 
tenable assumption is that relatively well- 
heeled contributors can learn about Com- 
mon Cause or other moderately priced 
organizations through experiential search. 
These members should discover new in- 
formation about the value of belonging. 
They learn that there are additional costs 
to participation. Members are solicited to 
give more financial support, and many 
comply. In fact, 63% of those surveyed 
reported contributing more than the re- 
quired $20. Despite this generosity, Com- 
mon Cause, with a staff of less than one 
hundred, lacks the financial resources to 
compete on an even footing with private 
interest groups. Like public interest 
associations generally, it employs other 
instruments to make up for these short- 
falls. One critical resource is energizing 
contributors to become politically in- 
volved. Members are asked to give of 
their time and become part of Common 
Cause's activist core. They are en- 
couraged to immerse themselves in the 
association's sophisticated, congression- 
ally based, grassroots network, as well as 
in state and local organizations. 
It is difficult to be simply a passive con- 
tributor. Those preferring only to write 
checks will find themselves the targets of 
periodic mobilization efforts when battles 
over issues pinpointed by the leadership 
come to a head. Forty-three percent of all 
members in the survey (32% of the rank 
and file and 68 % of the activists) said they 
had been contacted by Common Cause in 
the past year and asked to write to Con- 
gress about some issue.13 
Contributors also have opportunities to 
learn about the complete gamut of organi- 
zational benefits. Although the stereoty- 
pical individual who joins Common 
Cause is characterized as a liberal do- 
gooder, the leadership obviously believes 
that divisible benefits are necessary to 
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keep members happy. A bimonthly maga- 
zine is distributed to association members 
as an enticement to contribute; perhaps 
the consumption of this and the other 
political information furnished is suffi- 
cient to elicit a minimal annual contribu- 
tion.14 
Some may perceive another private 
return from participation, namely, career 
advancement. Suggesting self-promotion 
as a motivation is antithetical to the high 
moral ground that Common Cause tries 
to occupy, but it is consistent with 
Olson's by-product theory. An unex- 
pectedly high proportion of respon- 
dents-23 % -replied that they had 
political aspirations. Thirty-five percent 
of those surveyed stated that they either 
had political aspirations or had at some 
time sought a party position, an elected 
office, or an appointed office. When 
broken down between rank and file and 
activists, the percentages are 32 and 45, 
respectively. This discovery suggests that 
the participation of many allegedly altru- 
istic liberals may be motivated by the 
search for a springboard onto the political 
opportunity structure (Schlesinger 1966) 
or perhaps by a desire to be educated 
about liberal positions. If it does the trick, 
membership is renewed; if not, the 
aspirant moves on and continues to 
search. 
Common Cause has been involved in 
many celebrated battles, generally 
associated with "good government" issues 
designed to provide a host of nonexclu- 
sive collective goods. The leadership 
selects its policy areas carefully to main- 
tain membership loyalty. To gather infor- 
mation about constituent preferences, the 
staff annually polls contributors for their 
opinions about the Common Cause 
political agenda. Choosing those issues 
over which opinions are particularly 
homogeneous is considered especially im- 
portant (McFarland 1984). 
This decision-making strategy has 
several interesting implications. It implies 
a belief that members either think they 
have an impact on the provision of collec- 
tive goods or get considerable value from 
the purposive statement that their par- 
ticipation in Common Cause makes to the 
world. Assuming that the leadership's in- 
ference is correct, this conflict-minimizing 
strategy should also mitigate the impact 
on retention decisions of members' satis- 
faction or dissatisfaction over the associ- 
ation's political actions. If those in charge 
selected issues exclusively on other 
criteria, for instance, if they mistakenly 
viewed political action as a by-product 
that has no weight in participants' deci- 
sion calculi, then contributors' evalua- 
tions of Common Cause's political efforts 
would be more germane in conditional 
membership decisions. 
Common Cause's decentralized struc- 
ture obviously provides ample opportuni- 
ties for interpersonal interactions (see also 
McFarland 1984). Although much of this 
is a product of organizational weakness- 
lack of funds forces the staff to rely heav- 
ily upon its other major resource, an ener- 
getic membership-it may also be a 
strength when it comes to keeping con- 
tributors in the organization. 
Why Join in the First Place? 
Information on members' professed 
reasons for joining Common Cause can- 
not explain why people belong. There are 
no data on those electing not to sign up. 
However, contributors' beliefs about why 
they originally joined do furnish a van- 
tage point from which the retention pro- 
cess can be understood. Are participants' 
reasons for staying or leaving consistent 
with their assessments of why they ini- 
tially contributed? Or do other unrelated 
factors enter their calculations? 
Using an open-ended format, members 
were asked why they joined. Their 
responses were coded according to the 
type of benefits they seemed to value 
most. The most intriguing result is that 
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the vast majority of contributors believe 
that they got involved for purposive 
reasons (Table 1). Even employing an ex- 
traordinarily broad definition of selective 
benefits, 72% of respondents must be 
classified as professing that purposive 
concerns stimulated them to sign up.15 
These data are consistent with the ex- 
periential search argument that members 
know little about the specific costs and 
benefits of belonging when they initially 
join. General reformist tendencies were 
Table 1. Members' Proclaimed Reasons for Joining Common Cause 
Number of 
Reason for joining Respondents Percentage 
Purposive benefits 
Supports general goals, issues, or efforts 169 14.7 
Keeps government honest and fair 162 14.1 
Reforms, improves government; makes government more 
responsive 132 11.5 
Combats special interests, lobbyists, PACs, corporations, 
big business 79 6.9 
Supports public interest and the common good 71 6.2 
Is a watchdog-investigatory group 53 4.6 
Is a nonpartisan group 26 2.3 
Protests political power and corruption 21 1.8 
Supports in general (no issue content) 20 1.7 
Is concerned about democracy 18 1.6 
Is antigovernment or anti-political parties 17 1.5 
Appeals to sense of civic duty 13 1.1 
Addresses problems in society, government policies 11 1.0 
Maintains checks and balances 10 0.9 
Is unique and important 9 0.8 
Needs financial support 8 0.7 
Is a liberal and anticonservative group 6 0.5 
Subtotal 825 71.9 
Selective benefits (collective or divisible) 
Makes member effective 65 5.7 
Provides political information 53 4.6 
Addresses specific issue(s) 35 3.0 
Offers a chance for personal political activity 32 2.8 
Provides collective action necessary for change 28 2.4 
Supplies leadership 26 2.3 
Provides representation 18 1.6 
Informs citizens and encourages participatory democracy 12 1.0 
Offers a chance to be mobilized on issues 11 1.0 
Is effective 9 0.8 
Is an activist organization 5 0.4 
Subtotal 294 25.6 
Solidary benefits 
Family or friends belong 11 1.0 
Joining is part of life style-social reasons 3 0.3 
Subtotal 14 1.3 
Miscellaneous 16 1.4 
Total 1,149 100.2 
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Table 2. Organizational Experience and Knowledge about Group (%) 
Years Percentage Correct Mean Percentage 
in Group 0 25 50 75 100 Correct 
1 34.1 31.7 26.8 4.9 2.4 27.5 
2 34.9 23.3 30.2 8.1 3.5 30.5 
3 20.4 18.4 28.6 25.5 7.1 45.2 
4 9.6 19.3 22.9 42.2 6.0 53.9 
5 7.3 15.9 35.4 30.5 11.0 55.5 
6 12.1 13.6 28.8 30.3 15.2 55.7 
7 5.4 14.7 28.7 31.0 20.2 61.4 
8 2.5 13.6 25.9 42.0 16.0 63.9 
9 4.9 10.7 29.1 32.0 23.3 64.6 
10 3.4 11.2 16.9 47.2 21.3 70.0 
11 2.8 8.4 25.2 28.0 35.5 71.3 
12 5.3 5.3 23.7 39.5 26.3 69.1 
Number 
of Cases 116 159 307 368 205 1,115 
Note: X2 = 254, df = 44. Each cell gives the percentage of members who have been in group for x years (row) 
who get the designated percentage (column) of the answers correct. 
especially evident among those with a 
purposive impetus. Even many whose in- 
itial participation allegedly reflects the 
quest for selective benefits exhibit a broad 
participatory impulse. They claim they 
chose Common Cause to be politically ef- 
fective or mobilized and generally not 
because of specific issues or other detailed 
benefits. 
Do Members Learn? 
An assumption underpinning the ex- 
periential search framework is that 
members learn about the costs and 
benefits of participating. More extensive 
knowledge about these organizational 
features can lead to higher or lower levels 
of retention. But regardless of whether 
members stay or leave, learning is a fun- 
damental component of experiential 
search. 16 A prerequisite for validating this 
perspective is ascertaining whether con- 
tributors learn through organizational ex- 
posure.17 In Common Cause, individuals 
with many years of associational ex- 
perience are no different sociodemograph- 
ically than newcomers. They are indistin- 
guishable in terms of education or in- 
come, so any variation must emanate 
from other sources. Findings that long- 
term contributors know more about the 
organization would demonstrate that 
members learn and would provide impor- 
tant side evidence that experiential search 
is fundamental for associational member- 
ship. 
Several straightforward tests clearly 
show that new arrivals and long-time con- 
tributors are only distinguishable as a 
result of their organizational exposure. 
Members answered a battery of four basic 
questions about their organizational 
acumen.18 When respondents' knowledge 
is broken out by length of membership, 
the experiential search perspective 
receives strong support. Long-time con- 
tributors know a great deal more than 
newcomers (Table 2). Roughly one-third 
of the one- or two-year members missed 
all four of these questions; the same is true 
of less than 5% of the members who have 
been in the group for more than 10 years. 
Also, as expected, the mean level of 
knowledge from one cohort to the next 
shows a clear pattern of diminishing 
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Table 3. Organizational Experience and Group Issue Opinions 
(Common Cause Members without Opinions) (%) 
Organizational Experience 
(Years in Group) Total Number 
Issue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Percentage of Cases X2 
Limit government spending 58 38 37 31 40 37 33 39 51 45 51 43 41 1,155 22* 
Sunset legislation 40 23 20 21 11 13 9 11 6 8 14 10 14 1,164 54** 
Campaign finance 24 24 11 10 6 7 5 1 2 1 7 3 7 1,167 74** 
Equal rights amendment 28 30 26 19 24 19 13 18 17 12 15 13 18 1,162 25** 
Lobby disclosure 20 20 14 8 5 9 5 1 3 1 11 4 7 1,174 56** 
*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
Table 4. Organizational Experience and Personal Issue Opinions 
(Common Cause Members without Opinions) (%) 
Organizational Experience 
(Years in Group) Total Number 
Issue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Percentage of Cases X2 
Limit government spending 5 8 7 7 6 9 3 2 8 5 3 6 6 1,173 9 
Sunset legislation 2 3 9 2 1 6 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 1,183 21* 
Campaign finance 2 1 6 6 2 4 2 1 0 1 2 4 3 1,181 15 
Equal rights amendment 0 3 6 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1,182 13 
Lobby disclosure 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1,186 11 
Defense spending 10 10 4 11 12 9 6 3 5 5 5 10 7 1,180 15 
Equality of opportunity 3 16 19 12 17 6 18 10 17 17 19 12 15 1,179 18 
Social service spending 5 11 6 10 1 14 6 6 10 8 8 8 8 1,167 13 
Inflation 13 22 16 22 20 18 11 16 21 21 24 19 19 1,167 11 
Abortion 10 1 7 5 2 4 2 4 2 1 3 3 3 1,178 16 
Minimum guaranteed income 13 8 16 14 17 14 12 18 16 16 20 17 15 1,172 7 
School busing 8 15 10 14 11 6 15 15 16 17 20 13 14 1,176 12 
Nuclear energy 8 10 10 14 20 11 15 11 13 11 8 17 13 1,180 13 
Soviet relations 33 39 25 20 32 34 32 27 29 31 29 30 30 1,180 10 
*p <.05 
marginal returns with organizational ex- 
perience. A year has roughly four times as 
much impact for newcomers as for long- 
time members. 
Next, consider knowledge about the 
collective goods that Common Cause fur- 
nishes. Members were asked about associ- 
ational positions on five issues on the 
group's political agenda. In four out of 
five instances, new members are substan- 
tially more likely to reply that they do not 
know the Common Cause position on 
these policies (Table 3). 19 But when 
queried about their own positions on 
either these issues or other items not on 
the Common Cause agenda, differences 
between older and newer members are 
nonexistent, with one slight exception 
(Table 4). 
While recent members are as opinion- 
ated about the public agenda as long-time 
contributors, they are less well versed in 
the organization's stances. A substantial 
portion of new members could not have 
been motivated to join the group by its 
overall issue positions, since they did not 
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know them. This finding supports the 
belief that general, largely purposive 
benefits, rather than returns from specific 
collective goods, are at the heart of the in- 
itial joining decision. 
The learning process is also apparently 
fundamental for the leap from rank and 
file to activist status. Stated bluntly, ac- 
tivists are made, not born. Modal activ- 
ists have been in the organization for 
three years when they move up from the 
rank and file; a scant 10% of all members 
are activists from the start.20 This be- 
havior is consistent with a search frame- 
work. Imperfectly informed individuals 
join the organization, learn about it, and 
decide what their next step is-whether to 
drop out, remain in the rank and file, or 
step up to the activist cadre. 
The learning process provides initial 
side evidence that experiential search is a 
fundamental component of organiza- 
tional membership. Contributors write 
checks and then refine their knowledge 
about the organization. 
Exploring the Conditional Membership 
Process 
Quitting is an important consequence 
of experiential search. This perspective re- 
quires that some members leave, but the 
likelihood of exit should diminish with ex- 
perience. 
Retention decisions should be ex- 
plicable using the experiential search 
framework. To test this, four nested 
models, similar to those previously dis- 
cussed, are made operational: (1) the 
Olsonian model in which divisible 
benefits are assumed to exceed costs; 
(2) the same model with organizational 
experience incorporated; (3) this second 
specification with collective benefits 
added; and (4) a complete formulation 
that also takes into account purposive and 
solidary returns. Estimation of these 
models permits the determination of both 
whether organizational search is involved 
and what specific factors drive Common 
Cause participants to retain or revoke 
their membership. 
Measurement. The likelihood of 
membership retention in the next con- 
tribution period-the dependent vari- 
able-is made operational using a seven- 
point scale. Scores range from one for 
those certain to quit to seven for those 
certain to remain. Roughly consistent 
with Common Cause's 78% renewal rate, 
54% of all members queried responded 
that they were certain to renew (it should 
be remembered that the sample is 
weighted toward activists; only 49% of 
the rank and file expressed certainty that 
they would stay). The other 46% ex- 
pressed different levels of uncertainty 
(scored from six to one): 26% called 
renewal very likely; 12% said it was 
likely; 3% suggested that they were not 
sure; and another 6% claimed that they 
were not very likely to, were unlikely to, 
or definitely would not renew their 
membership. Half of the organization was 
up for grabs to one degree or another, and 
a nontrivial minority was relatively cer- 
tain of leaving Common Cause. 
The factors posited to structure this 
choice are made operational in the follow- 
ing manner: 
1. Costs of membership are measured as 
the ability to pay (family income) and the 
respondent's sensitivity to costs.21 
2. The relevance of three divisible benefits 
are incorporated: (a) the importance of 
publications and whether contributions 
would cease without them; (b) the per- 
ceived value of political information; and 
(c) whether or not a member has political 
aspirations.2 
3. The lure of collective benefits is gauged 
by whether individuals (a) agree with the 
positions of Common Cause on key 
issues; (b) consider the leadership effec- 
tive in providing collective goods; (c) are 
active in the group; and (d) believe that 
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they are efficacious in the production of 
collective goods.23 
4. Learning is measured by organizational 
experience, made operational to capture 
the hypothesis of diminishing marginal 
returns with both a logarithmic and a 
linear term of the number of years in the 
organization. Incorporating linear and 
logarithmic terms is a standard means of 
measuring diminishing marginal returns 
(e.g., Maddala 1977). 
5. Purposive benefits are tapped by 
whether respondents feel an obligation as 
good citizens to participate and whether 
they care about the group.24 
6. Solidary benefits are measured by 
whether the members value the interper- 
sonal interactions Common Cause pro- 
vides and a dummy variable on whether 
they have friends and colleagues within 
the organization.25 
Given these indicators, many expecta- 
tions are straightforward. Others are not 
as clear as they might seem and will be 
contingent on how well Common Cause 
provides benefits-for instance, the de- 
gree to which the organization satisfies 
members who want to promote their 
political careers or who seek rewarding 
interpersonal relationships. 
One clear, important expectation is that 
the sign for the logarithmic version of 
organizational experience ought to be 
positive (but there is no expectation for 
the linear term); this would reflect the 
diminishing marginal impact of experien- 
tial learning. Organizational experience 
acts as a surrogate for the respondents' 
level of information and their certainty 
about a host of factors that are correlated 
with time. As the previous empirical 
analyses demonstrate, members gradually 
learn about how a group functions and 
slowly develop an understanding of its 
positions. They should also become more 
certain about their subjective valuation of 
the host of benefits that the association of- 
fers. A big advantage in employing years 
in the organization is that it is a con- 
tinuous measure, which makes it feasible 
to test the hypothesis of diminishing 
marginal returns.26 
It is possible to debate whether some of 
the other indicators measure one factor or 
another. Some ambiguities are inevitable, 
since benefit types are not empirically or- 
thogonal to one another; and particularly 
in the case of collective and purposive 
rewards (to be discussed shortly), imper- 
fectly informed individuals are likely to 
confound one benefit with another. On 
the whole, however, the indicators in this 
analysis gauge what has traditionally 
been meant by divisible, collective, pur- 
posive, and solidary benefits, as well as 
the costs of membership. 
Results and interpretations. The or- 
dinary least squares estimates for these 
models (Table 5) show that the retention 
decision is explicable.27 Even when the 
focus of analysis is current members-a 
homogeneous, truncated sample of 
society-it is possible to separate out 
those prone to stay from those likely to 
leave. Such results are inconsistent with 
the informational assumptions underlying 
previous formulations of the joining pro- 
cess. 
A framework incorporating various 
kinds of returns and learning does a 
superior job to more limited alternatives. 
A series of F tests comparing each model 
with its more restricted predecessor- 
model 2 with model 1 (F2,1076 = 33.15; p< 
.01); model 3 with model 2 (F4,971 = 42.11; 
p <.01); and model 4 with model 3 (F4,911 
= 7.93; p< .05)-clearly identify model 4 
as the best specification (see Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1981, 117-19, for an explica- 
tion of joint F tests). Looking at selective 
incentives generated via divisible benefits 
is not enough; collective, solidary, and 
purposive benefits, as well as organiza- 
tional learning, also affect the decision 
calculus.28 
The whole gamut of costs and benefits 
go into the retention decision.29 The price 
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Table 5. Determinants of Retention Decisions 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 6.25** 5.38** 2.55** .61** 
Costs 
Ability to pay .01 -.01 .03 .03 
Low sensitivity to costs 1.11** 1.04** .83** .78** 
Moderate sensitivity to costs .51** .52** .45** .42** 
Divisible benefits 
Value of political information .01* .01 .01 .03 
Publications' value .15** .15** .09** .08** 
Low sensitivity to provision of publications .29** .20** .12 .08 
Moderate sensitivity to provision of publications .24** .21** .12 .06 
Political aspirations -.15** -.19** -.18** -.11 
Learning 
Organizational experience -.03 -.02 -.02 
Natural log of organizational experience .60** .38** .39** 
Collective benefits 
Agreement with group's positions .01** .01** 
Assessment of leadership's achievements .30** .27** 
Activism in group .08** lo** 
Feeling of personal efficacy regarding group .05** .05** 
Purposive benefits 
Care about group .04** 
Sense of citizen duty .07** 
Solidary benefits 
Value interaction .12** 
Friends or colleagues are members lo** 
Number of cases 1,114 1,085 986 930 
Adjusted R2 .18 .22 .34 .36 
. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~2 ,3 .3 
*p <.10 
**p < .05 
of membership is an important considera- 
tion, although ability to pay, per se, is 
not. While all members know the 
monetary cost of joining, some are es- 
pecially sensitive to it. Those finding that 
membership is not worth the opportunity 
costs-of foregoing participation in 
another organization, for instance- 
depart and either search elsewhere or 
become inactive. 
The salience of divisible benefits is 
more nebulous. When the Olsonian 
model is made operational the group's 
publications, the political information it 
provides, and the opportunities it fur- 
nishes to political aspirants all appear im- 
portant. When other benefits are fully in- 
tegrated into the decision framework, 
however, everything but the value of 
Common Cause publications is insignifi- 
cant, and even the estimate of its impact is 
halved. 
The utility of the Olsonian framework 
as a predictive model for retention deci- 
sions in public interest groups is ques- 
tionable. As an explanatory framework, 
it is even less successful. This is not a 
direct indictment of a perspective de- 
signed to explain initial joining in 
economic groups. However, it does pro- 
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vide some reason to doubt the assump- 
tions underlying this decision-making 
model. 
The effect of political aspirations, 
although insignificant in the final model (t 
= 1.3), is nevertheless intriguing. These 
individuals are less likely to remain in 
Common Cause than other contributors. 
Once they learn about the true nature of 
the organization-its antagonistic stance 
toward political parties, for example- 
they may decide that Common Cause is 
the wrong place for them and move on. 
Even if the politically ambitious are more 
likely than others to join the association 
(and given the percentage of members 
who have such motivations, this is prob- 
ably the case), they can still be more 
prone to quit. Conversely, the relation- 
ship between future aspirations and reten- 
tion will be positive in organizations that 
are good mechanisms for building polit- 
ical careers. 
Collective benefits appear to be an im- 
portant element in the conditional joining 
calculus. These findings refute the asser- 
tion that members never learn about col- 
lective goods; if the latter were the case, 
these estimates would be insignificant. 
Despite the fact that few members cited 
such returns as the principal reason for in- 
itially joining, they seem to be the most 
relevant factor for the retention choice.30 
Assessment of the leadership, level of ac- 
tivism, and feelings of efficacy all have an 
impact. So too does agreement with Com- 
mon Cause's positions. Of particular sali- 
ence are those good government issues- 
sunset legislation, campaign finance, and 
regulation of lobbyists-in which the 
organization has traditionally been in- 
volved.31 
An explanation for this tension between 
the apparent insignificance of collective 
benefits in joining decisions and their 
critical role for retention calculi centers on 
experiential search. Many people are ig- 
norant about the organization when they 
first sign on but gradually learn upon 
joining. All they might know initially is 
that Common Cause is a group that deals 
with good government issues and for 
which experiential search comes cheaply. 
After contributing, they discover more 
specifically what the organization does 
and how much it accomplishes. These 
data are employed in calculating whether 
or not to stay in the group. Members 
move away from a concern about seem- 
ingly purposive benefits toward an inter- 
est in more specific collective returns. 
This result implies that the traditional 
dichotomy between purposive and collec- 
tive benefits-the former representing an 
adherence to the group's stated goals and 
the latter reflecting members' beliefs 
about their impacts on the production of 
collective goods-reflects a false distinc- 
tion. The difference between these two 
types of rewards is overwhelmed, at least 
as it is tapped by survey instruments in 
the public interest group context, by the 
conditioning effect of information on the 
estimated policy benefits derived from 
membership. 
Put another way, what is being inter- 
preted as collective benefits may really be 
specific statements about purposive 
returns (this has previously been implied 
in Hardin 1982). Contributors' responses 
may reflect their perceptions of the 
group's, and not their personal, impact on 
the provision of collective benefits. Their 
assessment of the group's leadership and 
policies is important for deciding whether 
to exit because they think the organiza- 
tion can have an impact on the produc- 
tion of public goods. They learn about the 
group's efficacy and how their policy 
preferences correspond to the organiza- 
tion's and either stay or depart accord- 
ingly. Learning integrates initial and con- 
ditional membership: broad motivations 
are replaced by more specific ones. Group 
leaders have an incentive to foster the 
confusion between individual and associ- 
ational efficacy. To the extent that they 
control the information contributors 
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employ to update their cost-benefit 
calculi, the elites will add to the confusion 
by telling members that they make a dif- 
ference by acting collectively. 
Explicitly purposive benefits are still 
germane. Common Cause is a good place 
for people who really care about such 
returns and want to be good citizens. 
Even broad policy attachments to the 
group may make participation satisfying. 
Consequently, contributors who have an 
abiding interest in being good citizens or 
who develop a strong identification with 
Common Cause tend to keep on giving. 
To summarize, these findings about 
collective and purposive rewards support 
the proposition that members go from 
general to specific reasons for staying or 
leaving as they become more knowledge- 
able. This explanation is consistent with 
the side evidence about learning. All that 
is additionally required is the assumption 
that individuals recognize their informa- 
tional shortfalls before joining and 
employ experiential search to remedy 
them partially. This strategy leads 
members to offer vaguely purposive 
reasons for initially joining and more 
specific concerns about collective goods 
for staying or leaving. 
Similarly, solidary benefits are rarely 
mentioned as a major reason for joining. 
Yet they too are significant factors in the 
retention choice. For those seeking such 
interactions, the organization delivers the 
goods. Others may discover that a by- 
product of searching over purposive and 
collective benefits is a rewarding associa- 
tional involvement. Again, the tension 
between initial and subsequent condi- 
tional membership choices stems from the 
fact that contributors learn over time. 
Those who find rewarding interpersonal 
relationships stay in Common Cause; 
those who either do not care about such 
interactions or decide that the organiza- 
tion does not provide the solidary benefits 
they desire, depart. 
The findings regarding learning offer a 
second test of the experiential search 
theory and, once again, provide valida- 
tion. Specifically, they lend credence to 
the hypothesis that experiential learning 
yields diminishing marginal returns. Each 
year has a positive, yet declining, impact 
on the probability that members will re- 
main committed even after all the stan- 
dard costs and benefits of joining are in- 
corporated into the model. Ceteris 
paribus, a newcomer scores three- 
quarters-of-a-point lower on the seven- 
point scale than the most veteran con- 
tributors. In other words, there is con- 
siderable vacillation among new members 
about their future intentions, but this 
uncertainty dissipates over time. By and 
large, departing contributors are recent 
converts who, upon learning about the 
group, become disenchanted; they are not 
long-term members who grow bored with 
Common Cause. 
Similarly, the overall predictions from 
the full experiential search model (model 
4) lend credence to the hypothesis that the 
probability of staying increases tempor- 
ally but at a diminishing rate (Figure 2). 
The impact of the early years is roughly 
five times greater than the effect of the 
later years; and, as discussed previously, 
there are no obvious differences between 
long-term members and newcomers that 
might render this relationship artifactual. 
The only possible inference is that in- 
dividuals learn and update their informa- 
tion. Those who like what they see stay, 
and the rest search elsewhere. This con- 
clusion is consistent with Common 
Cause's own troubles in holding onto new 
members. Only about 55% of first-year 
members continue to contribute the 
following year, while roughly 90% of 
long-time members remain. 
Finally, consider what happens when 
the sample is split between newcomers- 
those contributing for six years or less 
and veterans and a revised version of 
model 4 is estimated (Table 6).32 Most 
strikingly-but predictably from an ex- 
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Figure 2. Retention Predictions 
and Organizational Experience 
7.0 
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5.0. * | . . . . . . 
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Experience (Years in Group) 
Note: Predictions are based on the seven-point scale used to measure a respondent's probability of retention. 
Scores range from one (certain to quit) to seven (certain to renew). 
periential search perspective-the model 
does a superior job of explaining why 
newcomers come and go as compared to 
veterans. Longer-term members more 
closely approximate the full information 
ideal and are prone to depart for idiosyn- 
cratic reasons. Also as predicted, specific 
characteristics loom larger in newcomers' 
retention decisions. 
While there is no appreciable difference 
between the two samples in the findings 
for purposive benefits (no coefficient is 
significant), there are variations in the ef- 
fects of solidary benefits and especially 
collective returns. In the latter the impact 
of these factors is stronger for newcomers 
than for veterans. Not only is learning 
about specific characteristics crucial, it is 
especially salient for those who are new to 
the organization.33 
All three tests of the experiential search 
perspective support its validity as a 
superior framework for conceptualizing 
the retention choice. Members make their 
decisions in a systematic, comprehensible 
fashion. The decision to remain in the 
organization reflects their discovery that 
the group provides the benefits they are 
searching for. Learning is an important 
component in understanding how condi- 
tional membership choices are made. 
Overall predictions about the probability 
of remaining in the organization reflect 
the diminishing marginal returns to be ex- 
pected if individuals garner information 
through experiential search. An individ- 
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Table 6. Retention Decisions of Shorter- and Longer-Term Members 
Variable Newcomers Veterans 
Constant -.23 2.06** 
Costs 
Ability to pay .04 .01 
Low sensitivity to costs 1.12** .56** 
Moderate sensitivity to costs .58** .23** 
Divisible benefits 
Value of political information -.01 .06 
Publications' value .12* .07* 
Low sensitivity to provision of publications .29* .10 
Moderate sensitivity to provision of publications .09 -.03 
Political aspirations -.19 -.10 
Learning 
Organizational experience .10** .04* 
Collective benefits 
Agreement with group's positions .01** .01** 
Assessment of leadership's achievements .28** .24** 
Activism in group .16** .08* 
Feeling of personal efficacy regarding group .02 .06* 
Purposive benefits 
Care about group .05 .04 
Sense of citizen duty .10 .04 
Solidary benefits 
Value interaction -.04 .13 
Friends or colleagues are members .20** .06 
Number of cases 370 560 
Adjusted R2 .40 .24 
*P < .10 
*p < .Q5 
ual's first years in the organization are 
especially important-particularly for 
learning about highly specific characteris- 
tics. 
Conclusions: Experiential 
Search and the Retention Choice 
Understanding why people leave or re- 
main in groups has received little atten- 
tion. The retention decision should not be 
taken as a given, that is, something that is 
determined by the initial choice to con- 
tribute. The conditional membership deci- 
sion is fundamental for organizational 
stability and is a constant source of anxi- 
ety for group leaders. It reflects an experi- 
ential search process through which con- 
tributors acquire information and make 
increasingly knowledgeable choices. 
This perspective is very different from 
either a game-theoretic framework or 
those decision-theoretic models adopted 
by previous analysts of organizational 
membership. Here it is assumed that im- 
perfectly informed decision makers are 
aware of their shortfalls and take them 
into account in making choices while 
playing against nature. Because accruing 
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information is costly, there is an incentive 
to become informed in the most efficient 
way possible. If the price of membership 
is small and a mistake is easily rectified at 
the next contribution period, joining a 
group and learning about it experientially 
may well be the optimal strategy. 
Common Cause members behave very 
much in this manner. The following pic- 
ture of the average contributor emerges 
from this analysis: Individuals join an 
organization about which they are largely 
uninformed. They have a rough idea 
about what it stands for, but they lack the 
detailed knowledge needed to decide 
whether this is the best association for 
them. They are as informed about 
politics, as educated, and as wealthy as 
long-time members. But they lack 
organization-specific information, which 
is best gained experientially. 
Consequently, the retention process is 
explicable by specifying a model that 
reflects information updating. Among 
other things, the findings make clear that 
early on when the incremental informa- 
tional gains are greatest, there is a higher 
probability that revising prior beliefs will 
precipitate departures. As time progresses 
and the additional impact of another 
period diminishes, so too does the prob- 
ability of dropping out. The accrual of 
knowledge about the organization also 
leads members to rely upon more specific 
criteria in making their conditional 
membership decisions than they claim 
motivated their initial contributions. Ex- 
amining the model's overall predictions 
about future membership behavior simply 
buttresses the experiential search story 
further. So too does the contrast between 
what the model reveals about newcomers 
and about veterans. 
Group participation ought to be con- 
ceptualized as an experiential search pro- 
cess in which individuals with only im- 
perfect information are forced to make 
choices. They may commit calculated 
mistakes, but they will eventually rectify 
them. This framework makes organiza- 
tional quitting understandable and pro- 
vides a linkage between the initial 
membership choice and follow-up deci- 
sions. It furnishes insights into how the 
ebb and flow of group membership ought 
to vary systematically across associa- 
tions, depending upon both the costs of 
contributing and the variety of benefits 
available to association members. Any 
number of interesting comparisons for 
testing this general perspective spring to 
mind: for example, contrasting an organi- 
zation like Common Cause which con- 
ducts much of its business through the 
mail and over the telephone, and one like 
the League of Women Voters, for which 
interpersonal interactions that provide 
solidary rewards are more central. 
The empirical findings suggest that 
group leaders might weigh newer mem- 
bers' preferences more heavily than those 
of long-time contributors, assuming that 
both are equally valued. They also imply 
that any educational efforts should be 
centered on appealing to these new- 
comers; utilizing scarce resources to sway 
veteran participants is likely to be a less 
productive investment. 
What is needed in the future is the col- 
lection of data better designed to capture 
the dynamics of retention choices. With- 
out a doubt, the key flaw of the present 
research is that only limited temporal data 
are available. Future endeavors must 
employ longitudinal designs, including 
studies that follow up on individuals who 
begin, continue, and cease contributing 
(and perhaps go elsewhere); analyses that 
explicitly build in samples of the general 
public as well as group members; and 
research that incorporates a multiplicity 
of groups varying on those dimensions 
that should affect the amount of experien- 
tial search undertaken. Such data will 
provide a better, more integrated under- 
standing of why people join and either 
stay in or leave organizations than the in- 
itial attempt made in this analysis. 
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Notes 
Earlier versions of this research can be found in 
California Institute of Technology Social Science 
Working Paper no. 651 and in a paper presented at 
the 1987 annual meeting of the Southern Political. 
Science Association, Charlotte, NC. The assistance 
of John Aldrich, Kim Border, Bruce Cain, Jeffrey 
Dubin, Thomas Gilligan, Jonathan Nagler, Barbara 
Rothenberg, and John Wright is appreciated. 
1. Building a core membership is extremely im- 
portant for ensuring long-term organizational sur- 
vival. Even those associations that receive founda- 
tion grants and support from other organizations 
may find that these sources of income are unreliable. 
2. In her study of four Michigan groups, Cook 
(1984) does provide some data on whether member 
satisfaction-dissatisfaction is associated with inten- 
tions to remain in the organization. Moe (1980) also 
touches on the decision to exit in his empirical work. 
In an intriguing theoretical piece, Johnson (1987) 
demonstrates that if a median voter rule were em- 
ployed in determining dues levels (contributors con- 
stitute the electorate), voluntary associations would 
inevitably collapse due to exit. He also correctly 
notes, however, that group leaders can thwart this 
potential instability. At Common Cause, for exam- 
ple, dues are set by those running the organization. 
In his well-known work, Hirschman (1970) ac- 
knowledges that individuals may respond to changes 
in organizational performance by departing. 
However, his model is based on the idea that 
deteriorating leadership performance over time may 
precipitate either exit or voice from individuals 
possessing perfect information. By contrast, the 
present research explores the implications of im- 
perfect information for members' behavior. 
3. Retention is the term utilized in studies of 
reenlistment decisions by military personnel (e.g., 
Gotz and McCall 1983, 1984). 
4. This is a generic problem that all organiza- 
tional leaders face. Employers, for instance, also 
deal with the problem of holding onto valuable 
workers, as well as attracting capable replacements. 
What sharply distinguishes interest groups from 
other organizations is that nonparticipation in the 
public arena is a far more viable alternative. 
5. The Common Cause survey was conducted in 
the fall of 1981 by the political science department of 
Stanford University. It was funded by grant 
SES-8105708 from the National Science Foundation 
to Heinz Eulau in support of research by Jonathan 
Siegel. Many thanks to Siegel for generously sharing 
these data. Because this is a stratified sample, the 
descriptive information is frequently broken down 
between rank-and-file members and activists; but, to 
reiterate, the sample design has no impact on the 
hypothesis tests conducted. Only if the sample is 
stratified on the choice in question-for example, 
the decision to join-is there a problem. 
6. Not all of the alternative specifications are ex- 
amined here. For example, Smith (1985) develops a 
model of contributions to environmental organiza- 
tions based on the theory of club goods. However, 
none of the public goods that Common Cause (or 
few other groups) might provide have an element of 
excludability to them, which is essential for 
translating the economic theory of clubs into one of 
group membership. Similarly, Hansen (1985) fur- 
nishes a context-dependent model of membership 
decisions based on prospect theory. Incorporating 
his insights would require a complete panel design. 
7. Although the traditional distinction between 
purposive and collective benefits is employed at this 
point in the analysis, a different perspective on this 
dichotomy will be introduced later. 
8. Moe takes the imperfect information assump- 
tion somewhat further, but almost strictly from the 
perspective of group leaders (particularly, how to 
structure an organization to encourage donations) 
rather than from the contributors' viewpoint. 
9. An interesting implication is that fewer 
members will learn experientially in groups with ex- 
pensive membership charges. Instead, potential con- 
tributors will use their resources to search from out- 
side of the organization. Membership in interest 
groups with relatively high dues should therefore be 
less volatile than in comparatively "cheap" organiza- 
tions. 
10. A quintessential example of exogenous forces 
is found in Wilson's (1962) observation that 
"amateur Democrats" lose their enthusiasm to spend 
endless hours working for the cause once an election 
is over. 
11. As will be discussed in more detail, the ideal 
means of studying membership would be through a 
panel study. The analysis presented here is a second 
best alternative. 
12. Respondents were asked whether their present 
family income was (1) under $10,000; (2) $10,000- 
$20,000; (3) $20,000-$25,000; (4) $25,000-$35,000; 
(5) $35,000-$50,000; (6) $50,000-$75,000; (7) 
$75,000-$100,000; or (8) over $100,000. 
13. Seventy-three percent of those contacted ac- 
tually wrote: 60% of the rank and file and 90% of all 
activists. Further corroboration of the mobilization 
of the membership is given by the finding that 44% 
of those sampled (35% of the rank-and-file members 
contacted and 78% of the activists) reported writing 
in the previous year about at least one of the follow- 
ing six issues: a constitutional amendment limiting 
government spending, sunset laws, campaign fi- 
nance, reapportionment, lobby disclosure, or the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). 
14. An overwhelming 98.5% of those queried re- 
ported reading the Common Cause publications 
they receive. 
15. The 31 reasons for joining listed in Table 1 
were coded from 99 different answers. Only those 
citing a specific issue or issues, leadership, nonpar- 
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tisan group, or unique-important were subsequently 
difficult to classify into the four broad categories. 
They accounted for about 8% of the respondents. 
16. Empirically there should be (and is) a positive 
relationship between knowledge-and organiza- 
tional experience generally-and the decision to stay 
in the group. Those who gain information and do 
not like what they learn drop out. 
17. A strong caveat is in order: Cross-sectional 
evidence is being used to draw temporal conclu- 
sions. It is nevertheless hard to tell a compelling 
story about how employing this cross-sectional in- 
formation would confound this part of the analysis. 
Thus it is worthwhile to try to uncover evidence of 
contributor learning with these data, especially 
because they are probably the best currently 
available. 
18. The four statements (with their answers), to 
which members could reply true, false, or don't 
know are (1) members of Common Cause elect the 
governing board [true]; (2) members of Common 
Cause elect the Common Cause chairman [false]; (3) 
Common Cause is a federation of state and local 
organizations [false]; and (4) Common Cause state 
organizations determine their own issue agendas 
[true]. A further check was performed to make sure 
that the relationship between knowledge and tenure 
is not a spurious reflection of the fact that activists 
have been in the group longer. The data show that 
even after controlling for whether respondents are 
activists or rank-and-file members, the association 
remains quite strong, although activism also is 
related to organizational knowledge. 
19. The one exception dealt with constitutional 
amendments limiting government spending. This 
issue was relatively new on the Common Cause 
agenda, and long-time members themselves might 
not have had time to learn about it. More than 40% 
of the entire membership had no opinion on Com- 
mon Cause's position on it, as compared to a max- 
imum of 18% on the other four items. 
20. Rather than being asked how many years they 
have been activists, these members were requested 
to choose one of five categories: (1) 8-10 years, (2) 
6-7 years, (3) 4-5 years, (4) 2-3 years, and (5) 1 year 
or less. The three-year estimate is conservative; it is 
based on the greatest possible number of years- 
10, 7, 5, 3, or 1-that participants might have been 
involved relative to the number of years they have 
been in the group. If the means of the categories 
were substituted for the upper bounds, modal ac- 
tivists would be in their fourth year. 
21. As mentioned, family income is tapped with 
an eightfold variable. Cost sensitivity is gauged with 
two dummy variables coded from a question in 
which members were asked if they would remain in 
the organization (yes, can't say, no) if Common 
Cause raised its annual dues from $20 to $40. 
22. Members were asked two fivefold questions 
about the importance to them personally of (a) mag- 
azines and other Common Cause publications and 
(b) the political information the association pro- 
vided. They were also given a question parallel to 
the one on cost sensitivity in which they were 
queried whether they would stop contributing if the 
publications were halted. 
23. Position agreement is measured as 
5 
-1 [ V(ip -Xic)2], 
i=1 
where Xip and Xic are, respectively, contributors' 
personal preferences and views of where Common 
Cause stands on the following issues: an amendment 
limiting government spending, sunset legislation, 
campaign finance laws, the ERA, and lobby dis- 
closure laws. Of course, only those respondents with 
personal preferences and estimates of Common 
Cause positions are included. Contributors without 
issue opinions (see Tables 3 and 4) are excluded. 
Leadership assessment is an additive index combin- 
ing fivefold responses to questions about the 
legislative success of Common Cause and an explicit 
rating of how well the leadership and staff do their 
jobs. Activity is tapped by counting whether a per- 
son has (a) written or talked to Common Cause staff 
or leaders about a group policy or position; (b) at- 
tempted to attract new contributors; (c) attended a 
local Common Cause meeting in the last year; (d) 
voted in the 1981 governing board elections; or 
(e) completed the 1981 membership oll. Finally, the 
personal efficacy measure combines the responses to 
two parallel questions on how important o the suc- 
cess of Common Cause individuals think their own 
contributions and their own political activities are. 
24. The former is an additive index of the impor- 
tance assigned to membership in Common Cause as 
a means of fulfilling the responsibilities of citizen- 
ship, supporting leaders like John Gardner and Ar- 
chibald Cox and helping to ensure good govern- 
ment. Caring is an additive scale of member interest 
in each of the five issues used to construct the posi- 
tion agreement scale. 
25. The former is a fivefold response to a question 
on the importance contributors attribute to meeting 
interesting people and making new friends. 
26. It might be maintained, in the spirit of the sot 
called garbage can theory (Cohen, March, and 
Olsen 1972; March 1978), that organizational ex- 
perience is tapping the adaptation of preferences to 
what Common Cause has to offer, that is, the con- 
ventional assumption that preferences are fixed may 
be incorrect. Admittedly, it is impossible to dis- 
tinguish definitively between changing preferences 
and learning given the lack of panel data. However, 
the fixed preference assumption is probably quite 
reasonable. It has been shown in this analysis that 
individuals do learn about the organization's opera- 
tions and issue positions. It is also hard to believe 
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that Common Cause members suddenly develop a 
preference for good government, political informa- 
tion, or social interactions once they sign up for the 
group. 
27. Before estimating the models, a number of 
preliminary steps were taken. To ensure that it is ac- 
ceptable to pool the Common Cause-designated ac- 
tivists with rank-and-file members a Chow test 
(Chow 1960) was conducted. The results of the test 
proved to be insignificant, thus permitting the pool- 
ing. Also, Hausman tests (Hausman 1978) were 
utilized to ascertain whether any of the independent 
variables were endogenously determined (the 
logarithmic and linear organizational experience 
terms were tested jointly): none were. Additional 
tests were undertaken to investigate whether the 
standard sevenfold specification of the dependent 
variable was correct. A Hausman test for determin- 
ing whether the slopes for a seven-ordered probit are 
identical to those for a threefold analog (no, can't 
say, yes) led to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that B7 = B3 (X2 = 35, df = 19). This finding implies 
that the seven-category operationalization is subject 
to specification error of some sort, although the 
ramifications are uncertain. This discovery precipi- 
tated a further investigation to uncover whether a 
better specification was available. The obvious alter- 
native is a two-stage conditional structure that 
breaks the retention decision first into a direction 
(no, can't say, yes) and then into a strength (certain, 
very likely, likely) choice. When the log-likelihood 
ratios of the conditional and unconditional processes 
are compared (see Vuong 1986), however, the latter 
model is far superior. Given this strong finding, the 
unconditional, sevenfold specification was adopted 
with the caveat that there might be some superior 
alternative. Having decided upon this specification, 
both ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit estima- 
tion were employed. The results are identical for all 
intents and purposes; the OLS results are reported 
here due to their ease of interpretation. To reiterate 
what has been noted previously: attrition should not 
have had an impact on the estimates in Table 5. As 
long as quitting is related to exogenous factors-un- 
happiness with the group, evaluations of the leader- 
ship, and so on-and these factors are controlled 
for, the ensuing estimates are unbiased. None of the 
difficulties associated with choice-based sampling 
are relevant in this case. 
28. Multicollinearity is not a major problem in 
these models. The linear and logarithmic learning 
terms are highly correlated. This intercorrelation is 
to be expected but, as mentioned, utilizing a 
logarithmic and a linear term was suggested to tap 
diminishing marginal returns (see, for example, 
Maddala 1977). If one of the two terms is excluded, 
the other findings do not change substantially. On 
examining the intercorrelations between the in- 
dependent variables, only two other pairs of corre- 
lations are above the .30 level: the valuation of 
political information and publications (.59) and the 
two dummy variables on cost sensitivity (-.60). 
Combining the information and publication vari- 
ables results in a poorer-fitting model. The resulting 
variable is insignificant (whereas the publications' 
value is significant in Table 5), and no other substan- 
tive results change. There is also no appreciable 
change if the variable measuring moderate sensitiv- 
ity to costs is dropped except that the coefficient for 
high sensitivity increases in magnitude. To explore 
more systematically the potential for multicollinear- 
ity, the singular-value decomposition (SVD) recom- 
mended by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) was 
performed for model 4. Interestingly, the SVD for 
the full model shows a moderate level of multi- 
collinearity (SVD = 60). However, a major cause of 
this multicollinearity is the relationship between the 
intercept term and other variables: this result is com- 
mon when using dummy variables but does not 
harm the estimates. If the intercept and the logarith- 
mic learning terms are dropped, the SVD is cut in 
half, to a level where experimental work shows the 
multicollinearity is quite small (SVD = 30). Again, 
the findings are robust with respect to multicol- 
linearity. 
29. Unfortunately, no good measure of nonpecu- 
niary costs was available for the whole sample. An 
indicator that worked for part of it (N = 395) was 
whether or not Common Cause members responded 
to attempts to mobilize them. Even after controlling 
for all other factors, these costs are important deter- 
minants of the retention decision. This result pro- 
vides evidence that those who find these additional 
organizational demands taxing depart, presumably 
either to find an association where they can simply 
write checks or to leave the world of organizational 
participation completely. 
30. An increase of one standard deviation in a 
member's score on each of the collective benefit in- 
dicators would result in a jump of .71 on the reten- 
tion scale. This change is slightly greater than the 
impact of membership costs (.63), followed by 
divisible benefits (.23), purposive returns (.21), 
organizational experience (.18), and solidary 
rewards (.17). The strength of membership costs 
might be a bit of a surprise. However, the measures 
of cost sensitivity-the willingness to quit in 
response to a $20 increase in dues-are also tapping 
estimates of the value of benefits. 
31. These findings are based on a regression using 
the model 4 specification, with the sums of the 
squared differences for each issue being substituted 
separately instead of cumulatively. The two rela- 
tively new issues on the Common Cause agenda- 
ERA and placing limits on government spending- 
are not relevant. These concerns represent a depar- 
ture from the issues for which the organization 
gained its reputation and apparently have not 
become a prime reason for remaining in the organi- 
zation (or for joining, probably). 
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32. The logarithmic term for learning is now un- 
necessary, since the sample was split according to 
how many years a contributor was in the group. The 
definitive means of testing whether coefficients vary 
between newcomers and veterans is to employ in- 
teraction terms with the full sample. However, 
multicollinearity makes such estimates unfeasible in 
this instance. 
33. The larger impact of cost sensitivity on new- 
comers than veterans probably reflects the former's 
greater uncertainty about the value of membership. 
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